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Abstract 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the state of liberalization, competition, and 
regulation of major segments of the telecommunications industry in Turkey.  It 
shows that the competitive stance of the regulatory authority and the development 
of actual competition  have been uneven across segments. Specifically, the degree 
of competition has been higher in the mobile segment relative to fixed telephony 
or broadband.  The chapter also discusses the new Electronic Communications 
Law and argues that although not perfect, it provides a coherent basis on which 
the regulatory authority can pursue competitive objectives in a more even manner.  
However, the actual development of competition will depend a lot on how the law 
and the ensuing secondary legislation are actually implemented. 
 
1  Introduction 
Liberalization in the Turkish telecommunications industry has a history of about 
15 years in the mobile segments and at least 7 years in the fixed segments. 2   De-
velopments in different sectors have been asymmetric with competition more pre-
valent in mobile than in fixed segments, where competition is seriously lagging 
behind.  A new Electronic Communications Law (ECL) was enacted in 2008, and 
this was followed by the issuance of a large number of secondary legislation.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview and update on the state of li-
beralization, regulation, and competition in the Turkish telecommunications indus-
try. The chapter is organized as follows: The next section reviews the legal 
framework and discusses the new law.  The  developments in major segments are 
described in the subsequent sections. The final section concludes. 
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2 For the history  and background  of the Turkish telecommunications industry see 
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2  General background and the new legal frame-
work 
Liberalization of telephony services started with the launch of mobile phone ser-
vices in 1994 through  operators Turkcell and Telsim, which had revenue sharing 
agreements with the incumbent fixed line operator, Türk Telekom.  Turkcell and 
Telsim were awarded licenses in 1998, a move  that rendered the two operators 
independent from  Türk Telekom and which initiated genuine competition in the 
mobile segment. Liberalization in fixed line telephony started after the adoption of 
law No. 4502, which established an independent regulatory authority, the Tele-
communications Authority (TA), with powers to regulate prices, interconnection, 
and access.  Initially the authority to issue licenses remained in the Ministry of 
Transport, but that was also subsequently delegated to the TA.  Law No. 4502 also 
stated that monopoly rights of  Türk Telekom would be terminated at the end of 
2003.  
 
The framework developed in Law No. 4502 was inspired by the 1998 regulatory 
framework in the European Union.  It relied on an individual licenses regime and 
the identification of operators with significant market power (SMP), and the regu-
latory obligations that  could be imposed on them were not designed as an exercise 
carried out on the basis of competition law, as was the case in the 2002 EU 
framework.3  The TA itself moved in the direction of the 2002 framework in its ef-
forts to define markets and identify operators with SMP.  Finally with the adoption 
of Law No. 5809 in 2008 (the ECL), the regulatory framework became much 
more compatible with the 2002 EU framework. 
 
The ECL changed the name of the national regulatory authority to Information 
Technology and Communications Authority (ITCA).4  Overall, the law brings the 
Turkish regulatory framework closer to the EU 2002 framework, especially in the 
area of authorizations.  Some of the salient features of the law are as follows: 
 
Art. 5 of the ECL lists the duties of the Ministry of Transport, which include de-
termining strategy and policy for electronic communications services that use 
scarce resources such as numbering, satellite positions, and frequencies.  It also 
authorizes the Ministry to determine the principles and policies for the promotion 
of competition in the electronic communications industry, and take supportive 
measures.  This is in line with the general approach adopted in the liberalization of 
network industries where the Ministry takes on responsibility for general formula-
tion of policy and strategy for the industry and an independent regulatory authority 
is given the responsibility for the formulation and implementation of regulations.  
 
                                                           
3 See Cave (2004) for a comparison of the 1998 and 2004 regulatory frameworks 
for electronic communications in the EU. 
4 Both TA and ITCA  are used in this chapter, depending on the period under con-
sideration. 
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Indeed, the law mentions the following among the competencies of the ITCA (art. 
6) 
• To undertake regulations so as to install and protect competition and to 
prevent activities that prevent or distort competition, and to impose re-
medies on operators with significant market power (SMP) and on other 
operators if necessary 
• To undertake market analysis and determine operators with SMP 
• To undertake frequency, satellite position, and numbering planning and 
allocation 
• To maintain Board decisions, along with justifications and procedures, on 
matters of interest to operators and consumers open to public  
• To approve as necessary, tariffs and reference access offers. 
 
This list may deserve several comments: , first, unlike in the previous regime, 
there is an explicit reference to market analyses to determine operators with SMP 
but the link between obligations and market analyses is rather weak. Art. 7 states 
that “The Authority may identify the operators with significant market power in 
the relevant markets as a result of conducting market analyses. The Authority may 
also impose obligations on operators with significant market power with the aim 
of ensuring and promoting an effective competition environment.” It is further 
stated that obligations can be differentiated across operators with SMP.   
 
Second, the requirement that ITCA has to publish its decisions with justifications 
is a major improvement in terms the transparency and the accountability of the au-
thority.  
 
One of the most important features of the 2002 regime in Europe is that many reg-
ulatory obligations may only be imposed on operators with SMP, which are de-
termined on the basis of market analyses. This is also the case in the ECL. For ex-
ample, art. 13 states that in the case of operators with SMP, “the Authority shall be 
entitled to determine the procedures regarding the approval, monitoring and su-
pervision of tariffs as well as the upper and lower limits of the tariffs and the pro-
cedures and principles for implementation” and also to take measures to prevent 
anti-competitive pricing behavior such as predatory pricing or price squeeze.  Si-
milarly Art. 21 states that ITCA may impose accounting separation obligation on 
operators with SMP.  However, there are also some divergences between the ECL 
and the EU.  Art. 33 states that ITCA may impose carrier selection (CS) and pre-
selection (CPS) on any operator, whereas under the EU regulations these remedies 
can only be imposed on operators with SMP (Renda et. al, 2009: 33).5 
 
Regarding ex-ante and ex-post regulation, Art. 6/b states that the ITCA inspects 
and imposes enforcements against breaches of competition in the electronic com-
munications industry in violation of this law (i.e. law No. 5809) or of regulations 
based on this law.  From this wording it appears that violations of the competition 
                                                           
5 Renda et. al discuss other instances of divergences from the EU legislation. 
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law that are not at the same time violations of ECL are not under the authority of 
the ITCA.  The same article also requires ITCA to seek the opinion of the Compe-
tition Authority (CA) “in situations envisaged by laws”.  It seems the wording 
does not preclude the competition authority from investigating or adjudicating ac-
tions that are alleged to violate the competition law and ECL at the same time, 
though the practice of the competition authority so far has been not to investigate 
alleged infringements of competition if such actions are in an area regulated by the 
NRA.  Art. 7, titled “Provision of Competition”, uses a more general wording and 
states that the ITCA is authorized to investigate actions that restrict or prevent 
competition and impose remedies, suggesting a scope that may include  anticom-
petitive activities that do not necessarily violate the ECL.  Art. 7/b requires the CA 
to obtain the opinion of ITCA and take into consideration ITCA regulations in its 
cases in the electronic communications industry, including merger and acquisition 
cases. Art. 7/c states that ITCA, as a result of market analyses, may identify opera-
tors with SMP and may impose obligations on them in order to secure and protect 
an effective competition environment.  In short, then, it can be said that the ECL 
does not provide for a clean divide between the jurisdiction of ITCA on the one 
hand and the Competition Authority on the other.  There have been instances 
where the degree of cooperation between the two agencies has been low and there 
has been some disputes regarding the respective scopes of the two agencies (Ati-
yas, 2005; Ardıyok and Oğuz, 2010). 
 
The new law introduces two types of authorizations: notification and rights of use.   
According to Art.  9 of  the law, any operator that wishes to provide electronic 
communications service or establish and operate electronic communications net-
work or infrastructure notifies the ITCA.  If the service in question does not re-
quire a resource such as a number, frequency, or satellite position, then authoriza-
tion is provided through the notification.  Otherwise authorization requires the 
provision of a right of use.  The ITCA determines which services require a right of 
use and which among those requires a limited number of rights of use.   The num-
ber of rights of use can only be limited in cases where resources need to be used 
by a limited number of operators and to achieve efficient use of resources. For 
those services which the ITCA has determined no limitation in number of authori-
zation is required, the ITCA provides the right of use in 30 days.  In case the num-
ber of rights of use will be limited, there are two cases: When the authorization en-
tails a satellite opposition or a nationally designated bandwidth, then the 
conditions of authorization (such as starting date, duration, number of operators) 
are determined by the Ministry of Transport, but the authorization is done by 
ITCA.  In other cases, the Ministry does not get involved in the authorization pro-
cedure (except of the determination of minimum fees, see below).  Right of use 
that  is limited in number  is allocated through auctions.  
 
Authorization fees consist of administrative fees and fees for right of use.  The 
ITCA collects administrative fees from operators (not exceeding 0.5 percent pre-
vious year sales) in order to meet its administrative expenses.  Minimum fees for 
rights of use are determined by the Cabinet of Ministers.   
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The new authorization regime is a major improvement over the previous regime, 
and possibly with the strongest practical implications.  The previous regime was 
cumbersome in that the authority had to come up with quite narrow definitions of 
separate activities and authorize each through a separate license.  The old regime  
also allowed Türk Telekom to delay liberalizations through legal challenges.  One 
drawback of the current regime is that it still grants the Ministry some leverage to 
delay authorizations by acting slowly on the determination of minimum fees as 
has occurred a number of times in the past (Atiyas, 2005).  Another drawback of 
the current regime is that it does not apply to existing concession agreements held 
by Türk Telekom and the three mobile operators.6 
 
Regarding access,  Art.16 states that ITCA may identify operators with access ob-
ligations and that in case the refusal of an operator to provide access prevents the 
development of competition or creates a situation that is against the consumers’ 
interests, then the ITCA may force that operator to accept other operators’ access 
demands.  On operators with access obligations, the ITCA may impose obligations 
of equality, non-discrimination, transparency, clarity, orientation toward costs, and 
reasonable profit and the requirement that access service be provided on same 
conditions and quality as provided to own partners, participations of partnerships.  
ITCA can also require the preparation of reference offers (Art. 19).  It can require 
operators to make changes in reference offers.  Access agreements are established 
freely between interested parties; in case of disagreements, the ITCA engages in 
dispute resolution. (Art. 18).  The ITCA may impose on operators with access ob-
ligations that access tariffs be cost-based. In case the ITCA determines that access 
tariffs are not cost-based, it can set the tariffs.  If necessary, taking into considera-
tion the applications in other countries (Art. 20).   The ITCA may impose account-
ing separation on operators with SMP (art. 21). 
 
To sum up, the primary legislation, although not perfect, and not completely 
aligned with that in the EU, presents a coherent framework on which to build 
measures to liberalize the telecommunications industry and enhance competition.  
Following the adoption of law No. 5809, the ITCA has been active in putting out 
or renewing the necessary secondary legislation.  Such secondary legislation in-
clude Ordinance on Authorizations, Ordinance on Rights of Way, Ordinance on 
Access and Interconnection, Ordinance on the Determination of Operators with 
SMP and Obligations that Can be Imposed on Them, Tariff Ordinance, and Ordi-
nance on Number Portability.  Even though a detailed evaluation of the secondary 
legislation is beyond the scope of this chapter, overall, it can be said that most 
secondary legislation are consistent with their EU counterparts.  Hence the legal 
gaps between the EU and the Turkish regime have been narrowed down.  The im-
plication is that the lack of progress in the development of competition will be due 
to weak implementation and enforcement rather than lack of legal instruments. 
 
                                                           
6 This gap has also been identified in the latest progress report prepared by the Eu-
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3  Developments in major segments 
3.1  Competition and regulation: fixed vs. mobile 
 
As discussed below, the development of competition in fixed telephony and inter-
net/broadband has been extremely slow, primarily because the Ministry of Trans-
port and the TA have been slow in adopting, implementing, and enforcing the ne-
cessary secondary legislation.  Atiyas and Doğan (2010) argue that Türk 
Telekom’s influence on the Ministry and the TA’s lack of independence from the 
Ministry are to a large extent responsible for this state of affairs.  The fact that the 
Turkish framework allowed some residual discretion to the Ministry, especially in 
the area of authorizations, enhanced the scope for political influence.  By contrast, 
the TA (and indeed the Ministry) has been much more vigilant and  procompeti-
tive in the mobile communications segments, and has used its powers (albeit not 
always successfully) to encourage new entry (Atiyas and Doğan, 2007).  This dif-
ference in attitude, in turn, is partly explained by the fact that Turk Telekom  is ac-
tually a new entrant in the mobile segment through its subsidiary Avea (formerly 
Aycell).   
 
The difference in the attitudes of the regulatory authority toward fixed and mobile 
segments is perhaps best reflected in the regulation of interconnection.  There is 
general agreement that on the whole incumbents prefer higher termination charges 
and new entrants prefer lower termination charges.  In Turkey, the access and in-
terconnection regulation allows parties to reach their own interconnection agree-
ments.  If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the regulatory authority may in-
tervene and impose an access charge on the parties.  These default charges have 
been announced by the regulator on annual basis. Figure 1 compares the call ter-
mination rates in Turkey with EU average for mobile operators and single and 
double transit level for Türk Telekom.  The figure shows that termination charges 
on calls ending on  Türk Telekom’s network were highly above EU averages until 
2008, i.e. until 4 years after Türk Telekom’s monopoly rights were terminated.  
This is an excessively gradual decline in termination rates.  By contrast, termina-
tion rates for the largest operator in the mobile segment have always been lower 
than EU averages.  Hence, if the EU charges can be taken as a benchmark, the fig-
ure show that the regulatory authority has been more willing to encourage entry 
into the mobile segment relative  to the fixed segment. 
 
Place Figure 1 here 
 
 
3.2  Developments in fixed telephony 
 
The market for domestic long distance and international calls  was liberalized a 
few months after the monopoly rights of  Türk Telekom were terminated but ac-
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tual entry took much more to materialize because of delays in interconnection 
agreements and the necessary infrastructure to allow new entrants to connect to 
Türk Telekom’s network (Atiyas and Doğan, 2010).  Atiyas and Doğan (2010) 
also report that new entrants’ capture of market share was much slower when 
compared with the experiences of OECD countries.  In any case, competition in 
local calls remained impossible for a long time and was authorized   3.5 years after 
the monopoly rights of Türk Telekom were removed, in August 2007. The regula-
tion that allowed competition in local calls actually was an amendment to the 
(now renewed) Authorization Regulation and covered the provision of telephony, 
data, internet, and value added services over the fixed terrestrial telecommunica-
tions networks.  This regulation was cancelled by the Council of State in January 
2008 on the grounds that it was not possible to undertake more than one activity 
under a single license. The authorization was revised by the TA and authorization 
for   fixed telephony services (FTS) was finally published in November 2008. Li-
censes for FTS  were issued in May 2009.  
 
However, the mere granting of licenses is not sufficient to ensure the development 
of competition in fixed telephony.  One way to speed up service based competition 
in fixed telephony is to oblige the incumbent operator to provide wholesale line 
rental (WLR) services.  Through WLR, alternative operators can rent access lines 
on a wholesale basis from the incumbent operator and resell them to subscribers.  
That allows alternative operators to provide access services to subscribers.  In 
combination with Carrier Pre Selection (CPS), WLR enables the alternative opera-
tor to end the billing relationship between the incumbent operator and the cus-
tomer and allows the alternative operator to provide a single bill that covers both 
line rental and telephone calls.  It has been used as a remedy widely in the EU 
member states to encourage service –based competition.  In Turkey, it has been 
promoted by Telkoder, an organization of alternative telecommunications opera-
tors in Turkey.  Telkoder’s main argument was that  operators’ alternative means 
of developing access services, namely building their own access network or utiliz-
ing unbundled access to the local loop (UALL) provided by Türk Telekom (see 
below) would take a long time to develop (Telkoder, 2008).   
 
In November 2009, the ITCA has imposed WLR as a remedy on  Türk Telekom as 
a result of analysis of the market for access to the fixed telephone network (ITCA, 
2009).  As of July 2010, Türk Telekom has prepared a draft offer that has been 
made available for public consultation. 
 
Another issue that has come up during implementation has to do with the assign-
ment of call numbers.  The ITCA decided in June 2009 that alternative FTS opera-
tors would be assigned area codes that are constructed by adding 1 to the existing 
81 area codes (one for each province), and FTS operators would assign numbers to 
their subscribers under these area codes.  According to Telkoder, that would have 
created the perception of dialing long distance calls among FTS subscribers and 
would have required them to memorize new area codes.  Telkoder filed a petition 
with the Council of State to cancel these provisions of the ITCA decision.  The 
Council of State decided to stop the execution of the decision in February 2010.  A 
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final decision is pending.  The ITCA responded by announcing that it would start 
assigning available numbers under the current area codes.  It seems there are still 
disputes between FTS operators and the ITCA about what numbers are available 
under the current area codes.  
 
The degree of competition in fixed line telephony is still extremely low.  Accord-
ing to market data provided by the ITCA (2010), as of 1st quarter of 2010, the 
share of FTS operators in total local calls was a mere 2.3 percent.  The market 
share of FTS operators was 10 percent in domestic long distance   (interprovince) 
calls, 18 percent in calls to mobile and 26 percent in international calls.  Overall, 
the share of FTS operators in total revenues is about 14 percent and the share in 
total telephone services revenues is about 7 percent.  Needless to say, these figures 
do not point to much effective competition in the industry. 
 
3.3  Developments in broadband 
 
Until recently there have been two main technologies or platforms over which 
broadband services have been delivered to consumers (Bouckaert et. al 2008: 8-
10).  The first is Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) which entails upgrading the legacy 
public switched telephone network (PSTN).  The second platform consists of the 
cable-modem technology, which entails upgrading the cable-tv network.  
 
In Turkey, as per a decision of the Competition Authority, the   cable-TV network 
was separated from Türk Telekom when the latter was being privatized.  The idea 
behind this separation was the hope that the  cable-TV network would be privat-
ized separately and sold to other buyers.  That way the cable-tv network would 
also be used to provide broadband services and would serve as a basis of competi-
tion against  Türk Telekom. Instead, the  cable-TV network was placed under the 
state owned satellite company.  The ownership of the network itself became the 
subject of many legal disputes, and effectively speaking, the network never be-
came a serious competitor to Türk Telekom or its internet subsidiary, TTNet. 
 
In most countries incumbent operators such as Türk Telekom have been under the 
regulatory obligation of allowing new entrants to use the existing network to pro-
vide their own DSL services.  This, in turn has taken three main forms, with vary-
ing degrees of infrastructure investment undertaken by the new entrant.  Under re-
sale, the new entrant buys the DSL product at wholesale prices from the 
incumbent operator and resells it at the retail level.  This form of entry requires 
minimum level of investment from the new entrant.  Under bitstream access the 
incumbent installs a high speed access link such as DSL to the customer premises 
and then makes this access link available to new entrants to enable them to pro-
vide broadband services. Under this form of access, the new entrant can provide 
its own value added services to consumers.   This is different from pure resale be-
cause the latter “does not allow new entrants to differentiate their services from 
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those of the incumbent”.7  Unbundled access to the local loop (UALL) comes in 
two main forms: Under shared access, the copper pairs are shared by the incum-
bent and the entrant.  The incumbent provides telephone services to the subscriber 
and the new entrant uses the high frequency channels to provide broadband ser-
vice.  Under full unbundling, the new entrant rents the full wire connection to the 
subscriber’s premises.  Under UALL, the incumbent provides the copper connec-
tion and the rest of the infrastructure is undertaken by the new entrant; hence this 
is the form in which the new entrant undertakes the highest level of investment.  
UALL also provides full control to the new entrant over the network.   
 
In Turkey, Türk Telekom (through TTNet) started to provide ADSL services in 
the early 2000s.  First attempts to promote new entry occurred when the regulatory 
authority mandated a resale arrangement in 2003 that allowed a margin of 18 per-
cent to alternative operators.  This was followed by a decision by the TA to man-
date bitstream services in 2004, which through legal challenges and other delay ef-
forts by Türk Telekom only became available in 2007-2008.  Efforts to provide 
access through UALL started in 2005 but the product became available only in 
2009.   
 
Broadband penetration ratio is very low in Turkey: 9 percent in fixed broadband 
as opposed to an average of 23-24 percent in the OECD and EU (Köksal 2010).  
As of March 2010, there are 7.4 million broadband subscribers in Turkey, 86 per-
cent of which are ADSL connections.8  Mobile broadband over 3G has developed 
rapidly over the last year,  reaching 8.6 percent of the total,9 and cable-modem 
makes up only 2.4 percent.  The share of TTNet in broadband subscribers is 81  
%, and the share of alternative internet service providers is only 6.1 percent.   The 
most widespread means of access of the alternative operators is bitstream.  The 
number of UALL is quite low, a total of 14.8 thousand as of March 2010 (only 75 
fully unbundled access) and access through resale is about 43 thousand.  UALL 
prices are not particularly high in Turkey, with wholesale shared access prices in 
Turkey almost the same as the EU average (€2.78 as of March 2010).10 Alternative 
operators mention several important barriers, including high installation charges, 
high charges for backhaul services, and delay tactics by Türk Telekom with insuf-
ficient enforcement from the ITCA.  In any case, the degree of competition in 
                                                           
7 ERG (2004). The ERG statement continues to state: “In order to be able to dif-
ferentiate their services (including such services as VoIP) from those of the in-
cumbent, new entrants must have access at a point where they can control certain 
technical characteristics of the service to the end-user and/or make full use of their 
own network (or alternative network offerings), thus being in a position of altering 
the quality (e.g. the data rate or other features) supplied to the customer.” 
8 Data from ITCA (2010) 
9 3G licenses were awarded as a result of a tender held in November 2008.  Con-
cession agreements were signed April 2009 and all three operators started to pro-
vide 3G services as of July 2009.  The number of 3G subscribers increased quite 
rapidly, reaching 8.7 million as of March 2010.   
10 www.cullen-international.com  
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broadband is very low.  TTNet share in fixed broadband is 89 percent and this is 
much higher than EU average, which in 2009 was only 46 percent!  
 
Moreover, broadband prices in Turkey are also very high.  According to OECD 
data,11 average broadband monthly price per advertised Mbit/s in Turkey (14  $), 
is about 40 percent higher than the OECD average (9.6 USD).   When prices are 
corrected for purchasing power parity, prices in Turkey are the  third highest, after 
Mexico and Poland.  OECD data also reveal that Turkey is really lagging behind 
in high speed connections: prices in Turkey are relatively cheaper for low speed 
connections and relatively more expensive for high speed connections.12  
 
The low level of competition in broadband internet is also due to strategic behav-
ior of Türk Telekom to prevent entry of alternative internet service providers in 
Turkey.  In a landmark decision13 taken in November 2008, the Competition Au-
thority has imposed a fine of 12.4 million TL (about € 6.2 million) on Türk Tele-
kom for abusing its dominance in the wholesale broadband internet market by 
price squeeze in the retail internet market.  In its decision, the Competition Board 
stated that Türk Telekom and its internet subsidiary TTNet endured operating 
without profits for long periods of time and implemented campaigns that would 
not cover losses at reasonable amounts of time and that these strategies were exe-
cuted in order to monopolize the sector. 
 
In a recent decision,14 the Competition Authority stated that Türk Telekom should 
provide naked DSL services.  Provision of naked DSL means that Türk Telekom 
can no longer bundle voice and data services together and that the subscriber can 
subscribe to DSL services alone, without having to pay for voice services as well.  
This is important for alternative internet service providers (ISPs) because as it 
stands a consumer who wishes to obtain broadband internet services from an al-
ternative ISP would still need to go to Türk Telekom to obtain a fixed line, and 
this reduces incentives to then re-direct herself to the alternative ISP in the first 
place.  The decision further states that unavailability of naked DSL also hurts mo-
bile operators because it slows down consumer switches from fixed to mobile te-
lephony services.  Availability of naked DSL is expected to increase broadband 
penetration and also demand for VOIP services.  The ITCA has specified naked 
DSL as a remedy in its latest analysis of the wholesale broadband market.15  Türk 
Telekom provided a draft reference offer; however as of June 2010, the ITCA has 
not finalized the offer and naked DSL is not yet commercially available.  
 
                                                           
11 http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband  
12 ibid.  Compare tables 4.l and 4.n.   
13 Decision No. 08-65/1055-411 dated  November 19, 2008 
14 Decision No. 09-07/127-38 dated  February 18, 2009 
15 http://www.tk.gov.tr/srth/dokumanlar/kgid/Toptangenisbantpiyasasi.pdf 
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3.4  Developments in the mobile segment 
 
The mobile communications market consists of three main mobile network opera-
tors (MNOs): Turkcell, Vodafone, and Avea, the subsidiary of Türk Telekom.  
The main problem faced by ITCA in the mobile segment was the continued domi-
nance of Turkcell, the largest of the three operators.  Turkcell has benefited from 
first mover advantages in the mobile market to establish its dominance, and is be-
lieved to maintain its dominance in the market by discriminating between on-net 
and off-net prices and thereby exploiting tariff-mediated network externalities to 
its advantage (Atiyas and Doğan, 2007).  Tariff -mediated network externalities 
are thought to work in the following way: When call termination charges are high, 
the cost of an off-net call increases.  This makes it difficult for operators to lower 
the retail tariffs of off-net calls.  On the other hand, since on-net calls are not sub-
ject to termination charges, on-net retail tariffs can be lower.  In addition, most 
consumers face switching costs when they would like to switch to a new operator.  
One widespread form of switching costs emanate from the fact that the consumer 
would need to inform friends about her new phone number (unless, of course, 
there is number portability, see below).  These provide a natural competitive ad-
vantage to operators with a large subscriber base: First, consumers who have not 
yet subscribed to an operator would choose an operator with a large subscriber 
base because everything else constant, that operator would contain a larger pool of 
people that this potential subscriber would call, so that a larger proportion of calls 
would be on-net.  Second, if callers get utility not only from placing but also from 
receiving calls (i.e. if there are so-called call externalities), then again an operator 
with a larger subscriber base would be more attractive.   Under call externalities, 
the incumbent would have an additional incentive to raise off-net prices in order to 
make the rival less attractive since that way the rival would receive less calls (Rey 
and Lopez, 2009).  In effect, the off-net price of an operator would be competing 
with the on-net tariff of the competitor (Atiyas and Doğan, 2007: 511-512).   
 
The ITCA used a number of measures to counter the dominance of Turkcell.  
These are explained below: 
 
Retail and wholesale tariff controls: In 2007, the ITCA (then the TA) issued an 
“Evaluation of the Results of Monitoring Regarding Turkcell Tariffs”.  The moni-
toring was undertaken in response to complaints by Avea, Vodafone, Borusan Te-
lekom, and Sabanci Telekom that Turkcell on-net tariffs are below interconnection 
charges and that differences between on-net and off-net prices are disproportion-
ate.  The report found that some Turkcell on-net tariffs  were below termination 
charges Turkcell applies to the other competitors and requires that Turkcell on-net 
tariffs should not be below the lowest termination charges (except for special 
packages designed for designated groups such as the disabled and the elderly). 
The report also imposed a cap of 0.66 TRY/min (about 39 Eurocents) on Turkcell 
off-net tariffs.  
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This decision of the authority was cancelled by the Council of State on the 
grounds that the authority did not have the authority to establish floors on opera-
tors’ prices.  On March 26, 2009, ITCA published a new decision that imposed a 
new wholesale remedy upon Turkcell, as well as a symmetrical retail remedy upon 
all MNOs. ITCA  was acting  following an investigation into the complaints for-
mulated by the two other MNOs, Vodafone and Avea, together with the fixed in-
cumbent  Türk Telekom, on alleged anti-competitive behavior of Turkcell.  In its 
investigation, ITCA concluded that during 2007 and 2008, several retail offerings 
of Turkcell included on-net retail tariffs that were below the applicable mobile 
termination rates (MTR) and that this practice distorted competition in the retail 
market.  The decision imposed two remedies:  The first was that the weighted av-
erage of MTR charged by Turkcell to other operators cannot be higher than the re-
tail on-net tariffs it uses in each of its retail packages.  The second remedy was 
that MNOs are allowed to charge the maximum retail tariff of 0.64 TRY (€0.30) 
per minute (including VAT and the special telecommunications tax) for calls to 
other mobile networks.  Even though the retail remedy was placed on all opera-
tors, the real target was presumably Turkcell: possibly, believing that call exter-
nalities do exist, the ITCA wanted to prevent Turkcell from harming rivals’ profits 
or from rendering rival operators less attractive by raising off-net prices and 
thereby reducing the number of calls that rivals’ subscribers would receive.  
 
It can be said that ITCA was quite vigilant in the enforcement of these regulations. 
In April 2010 the ITCA imposed a fine of about €400,000 to Turkcell for violating 
the restriction on the termination charges and a fine of €25 million for violating 
the cap on retail tariffs.  
 
Mobile number portability: Number portability is seen as a major remedy to re-
duce switching costs (Atiyas and Doğan 2007).  The number portability regulation 
was adopted in February 2007.  Turkcell challenged the regulation and filed a peti-
tion at the Council of State for its cancellation, but the request was denied.  Mo-
bile number portability became effective in November 2008.  An impact analysis 
carried out by ITCA (Güngör and Evren 2010) reported that by March 16, 2010 
more than 11 million subscribers had transported their mobile numbers to rival 
operators.  This amounted to 19 percent of pre-aid and 15 percent of post-paid 
subscribers.  Between November 2008-January 2010, one operator lost a net of 1.7 
million subscribers while the other two gained net 806 and 940 thousand subscrib-
ers, respectively.  Hence, according to the report, introduction of mobile number 
portability did reduce switching costs and increased the extent of competition in 
the market. 
 
Mobile call termination rates: Another important remedy at the disposal of the 
ITCA was, of course, interconnection charges.  It was mentioned above that ter-
mination charges in the mobile segment were among the lowest in Europe. This 
tendency continued and in March 2010 the ITCA further reduced MTRs by about 
52-53 percent, to about 1.4-1.7 Eurocents per minute.  They were already reduced 
13 
by 30 percent in March 2009.  As of March 2010, these were the lowest rates in 
Europe.16   
 
While it is difficult to gauge the specific individual effects of these different 
measures, recent developments in the mobile markets do suggest that the measures 
may have had some impact.  The most important impact seems to be a reduced in-
centive to discriminate between on-net and off-net calls.  Atiyas, Doğanoğlu and 
Koç (2010) report that Turkcell launched in February 2009 a new package (“lem-
on reprieve”) that entailed symmetric on—net and off-net prices. Interestingly, 
Turkcell started a major advertisement campaign for “lemon reprieve” possibly 
the first major ad campaign in Turkcell history for a non-differentiated package. 
This package was perhaps a response to Avea’s launch of a non-discriminating 
package on the eve of the implementation of number portability, but Avea’s strat-
egy itself possibly reflected the impact of both the introduction of number port-
ability and reduction of call termination charges.   The tendency of Turkcell to 
move away from discriminatory call packages and toward packages where on-net 
and off-net calls are priced symmetrically was evident in other instances as well.  
In April 2009 Turkcell introduced a package directed at public servants that in-
cluded symmetric on-net and off-net prices, presumably as a replacement or ex-
tension of a popular package directed at the same group but where tariffs were dif-
ferentiated. In addition, other popular discriminatory packages were changed so as 
to eliminate differences between on-net and off-net retail prices.   
 
Güngör and Evren (2010) report other interesting price data that suggest that regu-
latory changes may have had significant impact on pricing strategies.  On the basis 
of the retail prices of the most popular pre-paid call packages it is reported that 
that Turkcell’s prices declined by about 20 percent in 2008-2009 and that there 
was a significant convergence between the prices of the three operators, presuma-
bly reflecting a reduction in the premium that Turkcell could charge.  Further-
more, between  2009 and 2009, there were significant increases in the volume of 
off-net calls per subscribers for all operators (Güngör and Evren, 2010: 53).  
 
First, it may be underlined that the number of subscriptions  has actually declined 
over the last two years, from 65.8 million in 2008 to 61.6 in 2010-1.  It seems that 
the primary reason for this decline has to do with the fact that many users are re-
linquishing multiple subscriptions with many operators to single subscriptions 
with a single operator.  The main reasons for this, in turn, is that with the reduc-
tion in the degree of discrimination between on-net and off-net prices, users no 
longer need dual or triple subscriptions to avoid high off-net prices. Hence, ac-
cording to that interpretation, the decline in the number of subscriptions is actually 
consistent with the view that these measures have been effective.  
 
                                                           
16 Cullen International, Western Europe Cross Country Analysis www.cullen-
international.com 
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Turning to market shares, the market share of Turkcell (in terms of number of 
subscribers) did decline over the last decade from about 67 percent in 2001-2004 
to about 55-56 percent in 2008-2010.  However, there were no further declines in 
Turkcell’s market share in terms of number of subscribers since 2008, but an in-
crease in the market share of Aycell from 16.7 to 18.8 between 2008-1 and 2010-1 
and a corresponding decrease in the market share of Vodafone  (from about 27% 
to 25%).  On the other hand, Turkcell’s market share in terms of volume of traffic 
has declined from 49-50 percent in 2008-2 to around 42-45 percent in 2009.  It 
seems there was a similar movement in market shares in terms of revenues.  
Güngör and Evren (2010: 42) interpret this as reflecting the impact of reduced 
prices and the consequent increase in number of call-minutes that has benefitted 
Avea and Vodafone more than Turkcell. 
 
It is perhaps still too early to assess whether these are real trends or simply tempo-
rary changes, but at least one can tentatively conclude that market developments 
are not inconsistent with expectations about the likely impact of the regulatory in-
terventions  on the mobile markets. 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
The legal framework for regulation and competition in the telecommunications 
markets in Turkey has been improved considerably in the last two or three years.  
The new Electronic Communications Law, even though not perfect, provides a 
major improvement over the previous regime and establishes a coherent basis on 
which to push for the development of competition in the industry.  Lack of or in-
coherence of legal instruments did play a role in the delays in the development of 
competition especially in the fixed telephony and broadband segments, but unwill-
ingness or incomplete ownership of the liberalization agenda by the Ministry and 
the ITCA also played a role.  The ECL  is also a major step toward improving the 
transparency and accountability of the ITCA, especially because the ITCA is now 
obliged to provide reasoning or justification for its decisions and make them avail-
able to the public.  It will be seen whether  the duality apparent in ITCA’s ap-
proach to fixed vs. mobile segments will continue in the near future or whether, as 
a result of these changes, it will give place to a more consistently  procompetitive 
approach.  
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